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Approved for Release
Date 1000 1000

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Noted by JCI

10 June 53 958

PROBLEM:

1. To place in the record a report concerning the activities of Colonel Ulius Amoss, USAFR, and his claim to have successfully accomplished the defection of a Polish pilot and MIG-15 aircraft from Poland to Denmark.
2. To recommend that the Director, Office of Public Information, coordinate any official comment concerning Colonel Amoss and his activities present or future, with the Director of Intelligence.
3. To insure that Air Intelligence enter into no intelligence arrangements with Colonel Amoss and lend him no support of any nature.

FACTS AND DISCUSSION:

4. On 5 March 1953 a Polish MIG-15 pilot successfully defected in a MIG-15 aircraft, flying from Sulpsk (Stolpz) Poland, to Ronne Airfield on the Island of Bornholm, Denmark. Upon arrival he was immediately taken into custody by the Danish Government.
5. The pilot stated that his reason for defection was due solely to his disillusionment with communism and to a recent order that he spy on comrades in his squadron. At the time of his defection he indicated a desire to resettle in France.
6. Newspapers carried the story of this defection the same day that it occurred — 5 March.
7. On 6 March a bulletin (Tab "A") was dated and mailed by the "International Services of Information Foundation, Inc.," (ISI) of Baltimore, Maryland, which stated that the defection of the Soviet pilot and plane was the accomplishment of the ISI. This bulletin, in mimeographed form, reached several addressees on the Air Staff and in envelopes which obviously were addressed by means of an addressograph plate -- indicating that the bulletin received substantial distribution. It is signed "AMOSS."
8. The Amoss involved is Colonel Ulius L. Amoss, a former Air Force Colonel in World War II, and now a Colonel in the USAF Reserve. Amoss was born 28 July 1895 in St. Louis, Missouri, of native-born parents. He was first married to a Mildred Rogers, from whom he was divorced in Maryland in 1936 on the grounds of abandonment, with the wife the defendant. It is not known exactly when he married his second

wife, Flora Nason, but she divorced him in 1946 on grounds of non-cohabitation for five years. He married his third wife, Veronica Grogan in 1946; she was born in England in 1916 but became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1949. Amoss originally met her when he was in the Middle East during the war and she was a civilian working for MI-6 (Psychological Warfare Division), but through Amoss' intervention she transferred to the 9th Air Force and worked with it as a civilian until 1945. Prior to her coming to the United States she worked for a short time in the U.S. Embassy in London. She has many close connections with individuals in British intelligence, is reported to be an intelligent and clever person, and it is believed that she is responsible for writing a great deal of the material which appears in the ISI bulletins.

9. Between his graduation from school and his employment by the U.S. Government in 1941, Amoss had a rather varied career and apparently with different degrees of success, but he was principally concerned with promotional schemes of an import-export nature. In 1937 the FBI reported that Amoss, trading as the Greek-American Chamber of Commerce, was sending arms and materiel to the Red forces in Spain. In 1943, while Amoss was in military service, a company of which he had been a director, the Stafford Ordnance Corporation of New York City, was reported to the FBI as having been involved in the attempted sale of obsolete machine guns to various governments. The ordnance was confiscated by the Metals Reserve Board on authority of the War Production Board and U.S. Army Ordnance. Finally, the British Intelligence stated at about this time that Amoss was believed to be engaged in smuggling operations in the Far East.

10. On 10 December 1941, Amoss was employed in New York by the Coordinator of Information, and on 11 May 1942, at the request of (then) Colonel William J. Donovan, he was commissioned a Lt. Colonel, AUS, and assigned to the Coordinator of Information in Washington. With the formation of the wartime OSS, he became Chief of the Southeastern European Section, and in January of 1943 he was sent to Cairo as Chief, Special Operations/OSS in the Middle East. In July 1943 he was recalled to the ZI by Colonel Donovan. In the OSS archives is a memorandum prepared by an officer for Colonel Donovan on 11 August 1943 which states that OSS, from its own Greek Government contacts, "has learned that many of the individuals whom Amoss has picked to assist him have extremely bad moral and political reputations in Greece and could only be of help in dealing with a very small group in any Greek community."

11. Following his return to the ZI, Amoss resigned from the OSS and returned to Cairo as Deputy Chief of Staff to Major General Brereton, Commander-in-Chief, 9th Air Force, until the end of the war, serving with it in the Middle East, England, France, and Germany. His principal duties with the 9th Air Force appear to have been: intelligence supervision, foreign government liaison, command of foreign air detachments, military government, and tactical liaison. While with the 9th Air Force,

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SECURITY INFORMATION


Amoss became acquainted with a great many Polish and Czech pilots whose units were serving under that Command. For his services with the 9th Air Force he received the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star, the Army Commendation Ribbon, and several hands-full of assorted foreign decorations. On 11 May 1946 Amoss was honorably discharged, but retained his commission as a Colonel in the United States Air Force Reserve. The only active duty which Amoss is known to have performed under his reserve commission was from 22 November to 6 December 1948, when he was recalled at his request to two weeks active duty at the Headquarters of the 3d Air Division in England.

12. According to his own Personal History Statement, Amoss claims he has been President and Editor-in-Chief of International Services of Information since 1946, but official Army records reveal that in February 1946 he was President of World Trading Services, Inc., and an officer in the United Service Association. The World Trading Services, Inc., was an organization formed to provide the following services:

- a. Overseas information.
- b. American company "protection."
- c. Washington company representation.
- d. Government promotion.
- e. Anglo-American trade and industry recovery.
- f. Strategic materials and stock-piling.
- g. Barter and trade.

The United Service Association, a subsidiary of World Trading Services, was formed to "warn, forecast, and point out such opportunities that may appear, so that the trained officials of its clients may act in advance and thus be enabled to negotiate in the most propitious and friendly atmosphere possible."

13. Actually, little is known of Amoss' activities from 1946 to 1950. He was in England part of this time and published a "British Services of Intelligence" and acquired an interest in an intelligence digest "East Europe and Soviet Russia" published in Great Britain.



(b)(3)
At about the same time a U.S. Naval

intelligence officer on the staff of Admiral Connolly, United States Navy, stated that Amoss had implied he was connected with United States Air Force intelligence. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] At this interview Amoss stated he was a private businessman, a Colonel in the USAFR, and that he ran a private intelligence service which he sold to interested persons described by him as "a whole lot of damned fools who will pay \$200 a year" for them. [REDACTED]

14. On 9 February 1949, the International Services of Information, Inc., (ISI) was incorporated in the State of Delaware as a tax-free foundation. The charter describes in part the nature of its business and its objects as follows:

"to own and operate news services and syndicate newspapers and other publications, and to undertake any operations relating to the gathering, combining, and distributing of news and information of any kind, and to own, lease, and operate telegraph, telephone, cable, radio, and wireless facilities and other means of communication.

"to organize, establish, lease, rent, provide and sell means of communication facilities, features, supplies, and equipment between and among persons, firms, corporations, and other agencies."

15. The ISI also publishes a British edition called British Services of Information which is identical, both in content and management, except that the wording of the publication is rewritten to conform to British usage and spelling. A copy of part of an ISI bulletin is attached as Tab "B".

16. On 16 February 1951, the New York Journal American contained an article by its INS columnist Bob Considine, entitled "Russian War Plans Outlined in Report" which leads off with "Russian war plans are outlined dramatically by a private intelligence service headed by Colonel Ulius L. Amoss, Army intelligence officer in World War II." The rest of the article is merely quotations from the so-called report. Considine wrote the article as the result of a conversation with Mr. Howeth T. Ford, a New York realtor whom Amoss, at that time, was trying to interest financially in the ISI.

17. On 5 March 1951, a promotional lunch was given by the trustees of the ISI Foundation at which Amoss was the principal speaker. Eighty-seven persons, comprising some of the most prominent people in Baltimore attended, with each one paying for the cost of his own lunch. At this meeting, Amoss gave a long talk, lasting approximately an hour, during

the course of which he mentioned that he had sent one of his agents from Moscow to meet him in an undisclosed city, that the agent had to shoot his way out of a police trap in order to escape from the suburbs of Moscow. Amoss talked about other intelligence projects of the ISI and stressed the need of ISI for funds to carry on its work which had been done at great financial sacrifice to the principals involved, and at the risk of death for some of its agents.

18. On 20 February 1952 Amoss forwarded an elaborate brochure to the National Association of Manufacturers, in which he requested an annual budget of \$24,400 for the "purpose of administering a special socialist underground intelligence system" which would "substantially contribute to the socialist advances in Europe, especially as it is tied up with American covert socialist co-operators." It is not known whether he received this budget.

19. On 21 May 1952 Amoss gave a talk to a men's club in Akron, Ohio, on his private intelligence service. According to the Akron Beacon Journal of 22 May, he stated that his organization "has secret information contacts in sixty countries and the system includes a heavy blanket of agents in Russia." Accompanying the article is a photograph of Amoss demonstrating to his wife "how a city to city line of information sources is set up in Russia." The paper reported that Amoss spent most of the day chatting with a Father Berzinec who was the person instrumental in getting Amoss as a speaker on this occasion. More about Father Berzinec later.

20. In June of 1952 the Comptroller of the Fairchild Aviation Corporation of Hagerstown, Maryland, gave \$6,000 to Amoss. The money was reportedly obtained through the intercession of Ex-Governor William Preston Lane, one of the members of the Board of Directors of Fairchild, and was to be used for dispatching Father Berzinec to Prague in order to pick up from a defected Soviet aviator a MIG-15 manual which Amoss had also promised to the Air Force. Fairchild's reward for financing Berzinec's trip was to be a copy of the manual. Berzinec came to Baltimore prior to his departure for Europe and had lunch at the Maryland Club on 24 June with Amoss, Ex-Governor Lane, and other gentlemen of varied distinction. The luncheon ended in a prayer for Berzinec's safety.

21. Amoss' direct contacts with U.S. governmental intelligence agencies since the war have been few in number and completely negative in results.

[REDACTED] (b)(3)
In the spring of 1952, Amoss approached the Directorate of Intelligence

with a proposal whereby he would secure up to date plans of satellite airfields. It is believed that this was his first direct contact as a civilian with Air Intelligence. Through a representative of his, Amoss was given \$600 to enable the proposal to go forward. The results of this project were negative, although Amoss did not lack plausible reasons for failure. Of course, any clandestine operation of this type is often a gamble at best.

22. Soon after the "airfields plans project" was started on its way, Amoss again approached Air Intelligence, in the latter part of June, 1952, with a proposal for inducing the defection of a MIG-15 and pilot out of Czechoslovakia. The intermediary was to be Father Berzinec. (b)

Air Force representatives in Vienna were notified of Berzinec's mission and asked to arrange necessary signals and reception details if, in their opinion, there was a chance of success. No Air Force funds were requested by or given to Amoss on this project; in other words, it was a "free" deal.

23. Shortly after making these arrangements with Amoss and our field representatives, Air Intelligence learned of the Fairchild Aviation deal and queried Amoss as to exactly who was to benefit from Berzinec's operations. Amoss said that Berzinec had no project other than the one Amoss entered into with Air Intelligence. Amoss did state that Berzinec was "partially financed by an aircraft company which hopes he can bring them back certain information." It was decided, therefore, to continue with the project. However, instead of traveling to Austria as had been previously arranged, Berzinec telephoned the USAF officer from a Pan American Airways office in Munich about the 4th of August, requesting that the USAF representative come to Munich for the contact. From this point on, Berzinec's demeanor, conduct, and attitude were almost fantastic in their foolishness, insecurity, and neurotic character. It became immediately apparent that no arrangements of any nature could be entered into with Berzinec, and accordingly the Directorate of Intelligence canceled the arrangements. Berzinec returned to the United States without a MIG-15 and it is inconceivable that the 5 March defection of the Polish pilot could have resulted from any efforts on Berzinec's part. Certainly no MIG-15 or pilot defected from Czechoslovakia.

24. At about the time Air Intelligence was becoming suspicious of Father Berzinec's ability as a clandestine operator, Amoss approached Air Intelligence in mid-August for the third (and final) time, with still another proposal whereby he could induce the defection of a MIG-15 and pilot through a Czech Major, with whom he was in touch, from Prague to an airfield in Germany. This proposal, also, involved no Air Force funds, and Air Intelligence (but this time with its fingers crossed)

decided that it would pass the details of the proposed operation to USAFE. However, this project was soon canceled because Amoss could not, or would not, supply enough operational information to make it feasible and secure, because it was advised against (under the proposed conditions) by USAFE, and because, by now, enough information had been secured on Amoss and Derzinec to indicate that any success would be a miracle.

25. Needless to say, no MIG came out of Czechoslovakia and nothing more was heard by Air Intelligence from Amoss until his ISI bulletin of 6 March 1953 (Tab "A") was received. (b)(3)

26. As stated earlier in this M/R, it was obvious that this 6 March ISI bulletin had been given a wide distribution but, although this was of some concern to [REDACTED] the military intelligence agencies, it was felt that it would not have any effect on the Danish Government's position concerning the defected pilot and aircraft vis-a-vis the Polish Government. It was with some consternation, however, that U.S. intelligence agencies learned on the 13th of March that the INS columnist Bob Considine had again publicized Amoss by crediting him with responsibility for the defection of the pilot and aircraft. This appeared in his daily column in the New York Journal American. The next morning, and for a day or two thereafter, the story was presented in newspapers throughout the United States, and in other countries, in great detail and with somewhat sensational treatment.

27. Through official channels, the Danish and the British Governments expressed their disturbance at this story. On 17 March the U.S. Charge d'Affaires, Copenhagen, advised the Department of State here that it appeared unlikely the Danish Government would risk an appearance of giving credence to the Amoss story by releasing the pilot to the United States for asylum and, therefore, allowing it to be construed that the pilot might be a thief and subject to a Polish extradition attempt. As it turns out, the damage done by the publicity given to this claim of Amoss' is not crucial or irreparable, but the results might easily have been otherwise.

28. Dated 26 March 1953, Amoss issued another ISI bulletin (Tab "C") in which he purports to describe some of the background concerned with the "MIG-napping," disclaims any responsibility for the leak which resulted in the publicity, and attempts to belittle the damage caused by the publicity. However, this ISI bulletin ends on a hopeful, optimistic note by saying "let us retrieve the many advantages we can and turn a disaster into a triumph." Incidentally, it may be of interest that on 18 March the ISI Foundation solicited its mailing list for additional subscriptions to the ISI reports, based on the worldwide attention it had received as a result of the defection "it induced."

29. It is the consensus of opinion among governmental intelligence collection agencies here in Washington that Amoss has practically no clandestine intelligence capability. He is an intelligent, perhaps brilliant opportunist, with numerous and varied personal contacts within and without the government and undoubtedly in foreign countries, but his claim to have an espionage net in Europe, the Satellites, and within the USSR is believed to have no basis in fact. Although information in the files of the FBI, [REDACTED], G-2 Army, and the Directorate of Intelligence USAF, indicates that some of his business ventures have approached the border between legal and illegal, there is no evidence that that border has ever been crossed into actual illegality. Although there is no doubt that he has implied or inferred at various times an official connection with governmental intelligence agencies, it would be extremely difficult to credit an actual statement to him in this regard. He has had enough experience in intelligence, while serving with the Air Force, to give him a good background and working knowledge concerning modern intelligence techniques and operations and, realizing the gambles that must be taken in clandestine intelligence collection, and realizing the secrecy with which many individual clandestine projects are shrouded for security reasons, he has been prepared to play one agency against another, or one intelligence officer against another in the past. This has brought him financial gain and quite conceivably provides him with his main source of income. (b)(3)

30. The Director of Intelligence, USAF, [REDACTED] are convinced that the defection of the Polish pilot and MIG-15 to Denmark did not result from any activities sponsored by Amoss, but it would be impossible to prove that this is the case. Amoss realizes this, of course. It is equally impossible for Amoss to prove that he did induce this defection. It is believed that the Air Force can do nothing in this matter other than to:

- a. Make no official comment one way or the other on Amoss' claims; and
- b. Enter into no intelligence arrangements with him and afford him no support.

[REDACTED] (b)(3)

RECOMMENDATION:

32. It is recommended that any official Air Force statement resulting from possible queries concerning Amoss' activities in the future should be coordinated with AFOIN.

ACTION:

33. The Directorate of Intelligence, USAF, to enter into no arrangements of any nature with Amoss and to provide him with no support. (See coordination of responsible AFOIN-1 officers below.)

34. Dispatch of attached R&R to SAFOPI recommending it coordinate with AFOIN in any press release on Amoss.

35. ~~Signature by General Sanford and dispatch of attached Memorandum to General Vandenberg, which forwards, for his information, copy of this R&R.~~

COORDINATION:

General Ackorman, AFOIN-1, Ext 71672

, Colonel Rogers, AFOIN-1, Ext 56548

Colonel Cole, AFOIN-1X, Ext 56240

Colonel Satchell, AFOIN-1A, Ext 53036

Colonel Jones, AFOIN-1B, Ext 53093

Colonel Walton, AFOIN-1A1, Ext 73605